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WHEN A DEED BY MORTGAGOR TO MORTGAGEE
IS AN ABSOLUTE CONVEYANCE
WALTER B. SMITH*
T is common knowledge that the present method of
foreclosure is expensive, slow and cumbersome, and
that such work must be undertaken by competent attor-
neys who should be paid for their skill and experience.
Our antiquated foreclosure laws permit too long an
interval between the commencement of proceedings and
the final vesting of title in the mortgage owner. From
the investor's standpoint the situation is further com-
plicated, if the property is occupied as a homestead, by
the reluctance of the courts to appoint receivers of such
property and by the unavoidable temptation to persons
about to lose their homes to neglect the buildings and fail
to pay the taxes, knowing that any money spent for such
purposes would be lost to them along with the home. To
hasten the clearance of the title and to vest immediate
possession in the mortgagee, where no intervening liens
are found, many attorneys have recommended the giving
of a sum of money or some other consideration by the
mortgagee to the mortgagor in exchange for a deed of
the equity of redemption. In this way the expense of
court proceedings, counsel and master's fees, publication
charges and the like are saved.
* Member of the Illinois Bar; professor of law at Chicago-Kent College
of Law.
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Some attorneys hesitate to take this action, feeling that
should property value increase within a reasonable
period, the courts might consider the bargain unduly
harsh and look for some method by which the law will
presume that the transaction was inequitable or that it
constituted the taking of further security and thus allow
the debtor the right to redeem his property upon pay-
ment of the debt.
It is not the purpose of this investigation to consider
the myriad of cases which have gone to the upper courts
to establish the right to redeem from a mortgage which
in form was a warranty deed. Our statute on mortgages,'
as well as the uniform decisions of all the states, have
excepted this situation from the maxim of the common
law that parol evidence cannot be heard to modify a
written contract; so where the intention at the outset was
to make a conveyance to secure the payment of a debt,
whether already existing or incurred simultaneously with
the conveyance, such evidence is freely admissible. The
courts have uniformly permitted the introduction of such
evidence in cases where the intention is evident at the
outset.
However, this intention must be clear, as was pointed
out in the case of Sutphen v. Cushman,2 where a bill was
filed to permit redemption from a deed absolute in form
conveying several hundred acres of land in LaSalle
County. At the time of the conveyance in 1856 the grantor
was indebted to the grantee on a bond made in 1852, and
was also indebted on a mortgage held by the grantee on
the land conveyed by the warranty deed. At the time the
deed was made, an accounting was had between the
parties, but the bond and note were not cancelled.
Although the Supreme Court held the transaction to con-
stitute a mortgage, it stated that it entirely disregarded
the testimony of witnesses introduced to establish their
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 95, § 13.
2 35 111 186 (1864).
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understanding of the nature of the transaction and to
relate conversations of the parties, saying,
The conveyance purports to convey an absolute estate to the
grantee, and it must be taken as the exponent of the rights of the
parties, unless some equity is shown, not founded on the mere
allegation of a contemporaneous understanding inconsistent with
the terms of the deed, but independently, both of the deed itself
and of the understanding with which it was executed.
This case has been cited many times and still declares
the law on the subject.
Examination of the cases in most of the states indicates
clearly that the principal thing to be observed in such
transactions is the cancellation of the debt. With the
mortgage released and the note cancelled and sur-
rendered to the person liable, there can be no redemption.
It is a cardinal principle of the law of foreclosure that
without a debt there can be no mortgage; without a mort-
gage there can be neither foreclosure nor redemption.3
Therefore, if the transaction consists of a mere cancella-
tion of the mortgage and the debt so that the relation of
debtor and creditor has ceased, there is no reason in
the law why the mortgagee cannot take a conveyance
from the mortgagor with perfect safety. The danger
arises where some other element is injected into the
transaction.
The method most commonly followed by the local bar,
where the mortgagor, in the hope of recovering his
property, desires the mortgagee to give him a right of
repurchase, is for the parties to draw an option contract
which is given to the grantor-mortgagor together with
the cancelled note at the same time that the mortgagor
gives the mortgagee a deed to his equity of redemption.
By the option, the grantor is given the right to repur-
chase within a certain period at a certain price. If, in
such a transaction, the circumstances disclose the con-
tinuance of the relation of debtor and creditor, though
in different guise, a suit to redeem may, without a doubt,
3 Tarleton v. Vietes, 1 Gilm. (Ill.) 470 (1844).
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be maintained, and it is in such situations that most of
the litigation occurs.
The mere existence of an option alone should not give
rise to the presumption that the relation of debtor and
creditor continues, for one having an option is not, be-
cause of that fact, under any obligation to pay, and hence
he could not be regarded as a debtor. So where there
is no debt or mortgage in fact, an agreement to resell
does not change an absolute conveyance into a mortgage. 4
On the other hand, the failure to cancel the evidence of
indebtedness would give rise to the presumption that the
relation of debtor and creditor continued and the entire
transaction could be deemed a mortgage.5 The transac-
tion could as well take the form of a conditional sale,
whereby the title of the grantee would be defeated upon
the condition of payment by the grantor to the grantee of
a certain sum by a definite time. Whether the right to
reconveyance is evidenced by option or condition of
defeasance is immaterial. However, one should not form
conclusions as to the validity of a transaction as exempli-
fied in a case, without the keenest consideration of the
facts. Thus, in Hughes and Dial v. Sheaff,8 in discussing
the rule regarding the determination whether a deed
absolute on its face, accompanied by a contemporaneous
agreement to reconvey or an option to repurchase, is a
sale on condition or a mortgage, the court said:
... the line of distinction between mortgages and defeasible sales
cannot well be marked out by any general rule, and each case
must, in a great measure, be determined on its own circum-
stances....
And hence the court must take into consideration the price, the
circumstances, all the antecedent facts, the situation of the
parties, and from these determine the true nature of the trans-
action. These differ, as we know, as the names of the parties
differ, and they so influence the determination in each case, that
4 Glover v. Payn, 19 Wend. 518 (1838); Robinson v. Cropsey, 6 Paige
480 (1838) ; Baker v. Thrasher, 4 Den. 493 (1847).
5 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Carroll, 5 Barb. 613 (1849) ; Lawrence v.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 13 N. Y. 200 (1855).0 19 Iowa 335 (1865).
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it is next to impossible to deduce from them any general, safe and
comprehensive rule. Now, if the relation of creditor and debtor
in any given case continues, and the debt still subsists, we can
readily see that the relation of mortgagee and mortgagor still
remains. If, however, the debt is extinguished by a fair agree-
ment, and the grantor has the privilege merely of refunding
if he pleases, by a given time, and thereby entitles himself to a
reconveyance, there is a conditional sale and the equity of
redemption does not continue; for a mortgage without a debt, or
a debtor without a debt, cannot exist. The contract being fairly
made, a court of equity will not relieve the grantor who neglects
to perform the condition on which the privilege of repurchasing
depended. For while the policy of the law prohibits the conver-
sion of a real mortgage into a sale, it does not prohibit the making
of conditional sales.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Cornell v. Hall,7 a
somewhat similar case, said:
A glance at the numerous adjudications in controversies of this
kind will suffice to show that each case must be decided in view
of the peculiar circumstances which belong to it .... Where...
the mind is uncertain whether a security or a sale was intended,
the court . . . will be somewhat guided by prudential considera-
tions and will consequently lean to the conclusion that a security
was meant as more likely than a sale, to subserve the ends of
abstract justice and avert injurious consequences. And where the
idea that a security was intended is conveyed with reasonable
distinctness by the writings, and no evil practice or mistake
appears, the court will incline to regard the transaction as a
security rather than a sale, because in such a case the general
reasons which favor written evidence concur with the reason just
suggested. But if, upon the whole case, it satisfactorily appears
that a conditional sale was intended, the transaction must retain
the stamp which the parties have themselves given to it. Since,
therefore, the intention of the parties is the vital question, it is
essential to attend to their situation, the price fixed in connection
with the value of the property, the conduct of the parties before
and after, and all the surrounding facts ....
The former debtor's remaining in possession after the
transaction was an element in a decision of the Supreme
Court of West Virginia8 holding the transaction to con-
7 22 Mich. 377 (1871).
8 Davis, Committee v. Demming, 12 W. Va. 246 (1877).
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stitute a mortgage. After noting the possibility of an
inadequate price paid by the mortgagee to the mortgagor,
the court said:
If the vendor remains in possession of the property after the
alleged sale, this is a circumstance that tends to show that it was
not really a sale, but a mortgage, for such continuing possession
in the vendor after a sale, if not inconsistent with the sale, is an
unusual accompaniment of it.
In this case, however, there was no cancellation of the
debt between the parties.
In an illuminating case from Arizona, 9 in which a sale
by debtor to creditor with an agreement to repurchase
was before the court, it was held erroneous to exclude
evidence bearing on the question of whether the debt had
or had not been extinguished. The court said:
Had it been shown, by the execution of the deed... and the con-
temporaneous agreement to reconvey, that the relation of the
debtor and creditor ... had ceased by virtue of the execution of
the deed, it would justify the inference that the transaction
constituted a simple conveyance with an agreement to reconvey,
and not a mortgage.
Conway's Executors (and Devisees) v. Alexander,0
decided in 1812, is a leading case on this subject. The
Supreme Court of the United States there laid down the
rule that for a defeasible purchase to be a mortgage there
must be a debt continuing to exist in favor of the grantee
subject to the conveyance. The facts made it plain that
the grantor was under no obligation to repay and that
the grantee had no desire to lend money with or without
security. Chief Justice Marshall made the following
often quoted statement:
To deny the power of two individuals, capable of acting for
themselves, to make a contract for the purchase and sale of lands
defeasible by the payment of money at a future day, or, in other
words, to make a sale with a reservation to the vendor of a right
to repurchase the same land at a fixed price and at a specified
time, would be to transfer to the court of chancery, in a con-
siderable degree, the guardianship of adults as well as infants.
9 Reese v. Rhodes, 3 Ariz. 235, 73 P. 446 (1890).
10 7 Cranch 218, 3 L. Ed. 321 (1812).
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Such contracts are certainly not prohibited either by the letter
or by the policy of the law. But the policy of the law does
prohibit the conversion of a real mortgage into a sale. And as
lenders of money are less under the pressure of circumstances
which control the perfect and free exercise of the judgment than
borrowers, the effort is frequently made by persons of this descrip-
tion to avail themselves of the advantage of this superiority, in
order to obtain inequitable advantages. For this reason the lean-
ing of the courts has been against them, and doubtful cases have
generally been decided to be mortgages. But as a conditional sale,
if really intended, is valid, the inquiry in every case must be
whether the contract in a specified case is a security for the repay-
ment of money or an actual sale.
In the case of Ranstead v. Otis," there was presented
the situation under which the power of sale in a mortgage
was before the court. An auction sale was held pursuant
to the power, and the property was bid in by a stranger.
The land was worth probably double the amount paid for
it, but because of the outstanding dower and homestead
rights claimed by the mortgagor's wife (who had not
joined in the mortgage), its market value was impaired.
When it was claimed that the sale was irregular and
therefore subject to attack, the mortgagor conveyed the
property to the bidder at the sale for a nominal con-
sideration and received from him a written instrument
by which the grantee agreed to reconvey the property
within six months for an agreed price, approximately the
amount of the bids at the mortgage sale. The mortgagor,
three years after the expiration of the period, filed a bill
claiming the right to redeem, and when the lower court
dismissed the bill, an appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, in affirming the decree, said:
Whether the sale ... under the mortgage was valid, or voidable,
or void, is a question not necessary to be decided. It was at least
a sale at which Otis bought as a stranger, and in good faith, and
as such purchaser he claimed the title in fee. For the sake, how-
ever, of removing all doubt ... he agreed with Ranstead, if the
latter would execute to him a quit claim deed, he would give to
Ranstead a contract entitling him to a conveyance upon the
11 52 Ill. 30 (1869).
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payment, within six months, of a little more than the amount
expended by Otis. It is wholly incorrect to say that in this
transaction Otis was abusing his power as a creditor or mortgagee.
He was not acting in either capacity, and was in no position to
dictate terms to Ranstead. If the sale under the mortgage was
valid, he already had Ranstead's title, and the agreement to
convey to him, upon the payment of $2,500, within six months,
was a simple act of kindness. If, on the other hand, the sale
under the mortgage was invalid, Otis was rather at the mercy
of Ranstead than Ranstead in the power of Otis .... But it was
only by the election of Ranstead that Otis could assume towards
him the position of a creditor. He had no debt which he could
enforce against Ranstead. . . . Although there was no monied
consideration for this deed, it is incorrect to say it was made
without any consideration. The consideration was the contract,
which gave Ranstead a certain right of purchase on reasonable
terms, in place of an uncertain right of redemption, to be attended
with litigation and expense.
In the case of Rotan Grocery Company v. Turner,12 the
debtor conveyed land by absolute conveyance to his cred-
itor and received back an agreement to reconvey on
payment of the consideration for the deed, and the court
holding the transaction to constitute a conditional sale,
quoted the following passage from Jones on Mortgages:
An absolute deed delivered in payment of a debt is not converted
into a mortgage merely because the grantee therein gives a con-
temporaneous stipulation binding him to reconvey, upon being
reimbursed within an agreed period, an amount equal to the debt
and interest thereon. If the conveyance extinguishes the debt,
and the parties so intended, so that a plea of payment would bar
an action thereon, the transaction will be held an absolute or
conditional sale, notwithstanding. And so, if there was in fact
a sale, an agreement by the purchaser to resell the property
within a limited time, at the same price, does not convert it into
a mortgage .... But if the indebtedness be not cancelled, equity
will regard the conveyance as a mortgage, whether the grantee so
regards it or not. He cannot at the same time hold the land
absolute and retain the right to enforce payment on the debt on
account of which the conveyance is made. The test, therefore, in
cases of this sort, by which to determine whether the conveyance
is a sale or a mortgage, is found in the question whether the debt
is discharged or not by the conveyance.
12 46 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 102 S. W. 932 (1907).
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A similar decision was reached in the suit of West v.
Hendrix,13 where the evidences of an antecedent debt
were cancelled and delivered to the grantor at the time
of the conveyance and the delivery of an agreement to
resell, and the court remarked that a mortgage cannot
exist without a debt and that an option to repurchase can-
not turn an otherwise absolute transaction into a mort-
gage, notwithstanding an inadequacy of consideration
for the conveyance.
A later Florida case,14 on facts somewhat similar, laid
down a test to be whether any obligation enforcible
against the mortgagor existed thereafter, saying that if
it is optional with the mortgagor as to whether any liabil-
ity exists contingent on his desire or lack of desire to
have a reconveyance, there is no existing indebtedness
which a mortgage might be said to secure, and,
Where a mortgagor, for the purpose of settling and cancelling the
mortgage indebtedness, executes and delivers to the mortgagee a
deed conveying the fee-simple title to the mortgaged property,
and the mortgagee, in consideration thereof, acknowledges pay-
ment of the indebtedness, and cancels and surrenders the prom-
issory notes, evidencing such indebtedness, together with the
mortgage securing the payment, the fact that in the same instru-
ment, or in another instrument contemporaneous therewith, the
vendee agreed that upon the payment of a stipulated sum, within
a specified time, to [sic] reconvey the property to the vendor,
does not render such deed a mortgage; there being, under such
circumstances, no debt or obligation for the payment of money
secured by the deed.
In California the court held an absolute conveyance by
mortgagor to mortgagee not to be a mortgage where the
deed stipulated that it was executed in consideration of
the cancellation of the notes and mortgage and was not
intended as security, notwithstanding that the mortgagee
had executed an agreement to reconvey on payment of a
sum of money and to permit the mortgagor to remain
13 28 Ala. 226 (1856).
14 Holmberg v. Hardee, 90 Fla. 787, 108 So. 211 (1925).
CIICAGO-KENT REVIEW
in possession until the expiration of the option to repur-
chase.15
A case from Iowa'( was similar in the principal facts.
There the mortgagor took, in addition to the surrender of
the notes and the contract of reconveyance, a lease from
the mortgagee for the period of the option right. The
court confirmed the claim of the mortgagee that the
transaction was a conditional sale.
Illinois is no laggard in following the path laid down
by other states and observes carefully the distinction
between the cancellation and the retention of the evi-
dences of the debt. In Johnson v. Prosperity Loan and
Building Association,7 Johnson filed a bill praying that
a deed and contract executed simultaneously be decreed
to be a mortgage and that he be granted leave to redeem.
The deed was made in 1897 and was an ordinary war-
ranty deed. By contract of even date the grantee and
Johnson agreed that the latter would pay certain arrears
on mortgages held by the grantee together with further
payments thereon. The contract provided that the grantee
might borrow on the property and required annual ac-
countings between the parties, certain compensation to
the grantee and his attorney, and reconveyance within a
stated period upon payment of all sums advanced with
interest. The encumbrances to be paid by the grantee
were in fact paid by him but he retained the cancelled
notes and trust deed unreleased. The bill to redeem was
filed within the time of reconveyance set up in the con-
tract.
The court held the entire transaction to constitute a
mortgage and that the limitation of the right to reconvey
set up by the contract was not a final extinguishment of
the right to redemption by the grantor in the deed. The
court called attention to the retention of the cancelled
mortgage and notes and the failure to release the instru-
15 Woods v. Jensen, 130 Cal. 200, 62 P. 473 (1900).
16 Bigler v. Jack, 114 Iowa 667, 87 N. W. 700 (1901).
17 94 11. App. 260 (1900).
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ments as strong proof establishing them as a mortgage.
In Pitts v. Cable,' Pitts filed a bill to redeem from a
warranty deed alleged to be a mortgage to secure pay-
ment of a debt. With the deed, a contract was made for
reconveyance to the grantor upon payment of the amount
of an existing debt with interest. The note evidencing
the debt was surrendered when the papers were signed
and no other obligation to pay the money was signed by
the complainant. The complainant remained in posses-
sion and paid part of the taxes. Four years after the
expiration of the time for reconveyance, Cable conveyed
the property to defendant Bennett, at which time the
bond for reconveyance had not been recorded. The testi-
mony indicated that the property was taken in payment
of the debt and not as security. The court, noting that
the mortgage was cancelled, held that the transaction
was a sale and not a mortgage, adding:
Had Cable retained the note, that would have been a strong
circumstance to establish the transaction as a mortgage. But if
such was the design, it is strange that Cable left the transaction
in the position that there was no mutuality. He had nothing by
which he could have enforced payment of the balance, had the
property proved insufficient on a foreclosure, had this in fact
been a mortgage .... It is urged that the fact that Pitts remained
in possession and paid taxes is evidence that the parties under-
stood the transaction to be merely a security. . . . Even if it
appears that he remained in possession not as a tenant but in
continuance of his former occupancy, it would not have been
sufficient to overcome the clear testimony.
In Mann v. Jobusch,'9 Henry Mann in 1875 made a
mortgage, which in 1888 was still unpaid. At that time,
Mann conveyed the property to Jobusch, the mortgagee,
and the notes were surrendered and the mortgage re-
leased. The parties thereupon made a contract for a
reconveyance on March 1, 1890, upon payment of four-
teen hundred dollars and interest. In June, 1890, Jobusch
conveyed the property to Ernest Mann, who had no
18 44 II. 103 (1867).
19 70 Ill. App. 440 (1897).
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knowledge of the contract of purchase by Henry Mann
nor of the claim that the transaction was a mortgage. In
1895 the present bill for redemption was filed. The court,
stating that a man cannot stand by and speculate on the
appreciation of values, held that the transaction did not
contemplate a mortgage, but that the conveyance was in
satisfaction of the debt; that the contract was not a re-
vival of the debt, but an agreement to reconvey upon
payment; and that Mann was not obligated to make the
payment. The court refused to allow redemption.
In Freer v. Lake,20 a bill was filed by Lake for redemp-
tion and for an accounting. In 1871 one Gilbert made a
note secured by a trust deed in usual form, and the title
later passed to the complainant, Mary Lake, who as-
sumed the mortgage. When the maturity of the notes
approached, negotiations were entered into between the
parties, and, upon maturity of the notes, Freer, their
holder, prepared a deed which was signed by the parties,
and at the same time wrote a letter stating that he con-
sidered himself bound in the event anything could be
made out of the property during the next three years
more than interest, taxes and so forth, to give Mrs. Lake
the debt extinguished. Within a month Freer sold the
property for about one hundred dollars more than the
amount of the cancelled notes, but repairs had been made
by him in about the same amount. The court held that
the relation of mortgagor and mortgagee did not con-
tinue, since there was no mortgage debt in existence, but
held that the letter accompanying the deed established a
trust and that Freer was bound to pay over any surplus
above the debt, interest and so forth, to Mrs. Lake. It
appeared from the case that the property had increased
in value during the three years subsequent to Freer's
conveyance.
In Jeffery v. Robbins," the following facts appear:
20 115 Ill. 662, 4 N. E. 512 (1886).
21 167 Ill. 375, 47 N. E. 725 (1897).
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Emma J. Jeffery and her husband made a quit claim deed
on June 28, 1888, conveying, in consideration of one dol-
lar, certain lots at the southeast corner of Dearborn and
Adams streets, in Chicago, to Burr Robbins. Her sole
interest in the land was a ninety-nine year leasehold
estate, and she was then in default under the lease for
rent, taxes and other items, in a sum exceeding six
thousand dollars. In the proceedings (a bill to redeem)
she claimed that Robbins agreed to advance the money
to make good these defaults and enough more to pay
the rents and taxes for the five years ensuing, and that
the deed was given as security for these sums. Robbins,
on the other hand, claimed that John B. Jeffery, the
husband, was on that date in debt to him in a sum exceed-
ing seventeen thousand dollars, and that he, Robbins,
advanced more than six thousand dollars to Mrs. Jeffery
to pay the ground rent and taxes and agreed with the
Jefferys that the deed was in payment of both debts. On
that date he executed to Mrs. Jeffery an agreement bind-
ing himself to reconvey the property to her at any time
within five years on payment of such sums. At the time
the deed and contract for resale was made Robbins sur-
rendered to Jeffery the seventeen thousand dollars in
notes held by him. Mrs. Jeffery having filed a bill for
leave to redeem on payment to Robbins of only the six
thousand dollars advanced to her for rent and taxes, the
lower court dismissed the bill for want of equity, and on
appeal the Supreme Court affirmed the decree of the
lower court, citing Pitts v. Cable.22 and Hanford v.
Blessing,2 holding that the execution of an absolute deed
and a bond for reconveyance does not of itself stamp the
transaction as a mortgage, but if the proofs indicate that
the parties intended an absolute sale with right of pur-
chase, such intention must govern, and further, that
where the evidences of indebtedness are surrendered
22 44 Ill. 103 (1867).
23 80 Ii. 188 (1875).
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such surrender is strong proof that a mortgage is not
intended.
Statements are sometimes loosely made that where a
deed is given simultaneously with an agreement to recon-
vey upon payment of the purchase price, the transaction
will be regarded as a mortgage. 4 Reference to the cases
cited in support of such statements will disclose an
intention of the parties to so treat it. For example, in
Weed v. Stevenson 5 the deed and agreement for de-
feasance were both recorded as a mortgage in the book
of mortgages and both parties so regarded it. In Har-
rison et al. v. The Trustees of Phillips Academy,26 the
conveyance, if absolute, would have been a fraud on
creditors, but the grantee apparently understood the deed
to be given only as security to protect him from loss
which he might suffer as surety of the grantor, and he
made no claim that the deed was absolute.
It is elementary, of course, that even though a deed,
absolute in form, is, as between the grantor and grantee,
a mortgage, a stranger, who for value and without notice
receives title from the grantee, will take free of any claim
of right to redeem. The aggrieved mortgagor in such
cases is limited to a personal action against the mort-
gagee.
While the cancellation of the debt is necessary and in
many cases is sufficient to close the transaction as a
mortgage, equity has the power to set aside a deed of
the mortgagor's equity of redemption if the deed is
shown to have been procured through oppression, fraud,
or undue influence, and gross inadequacy of consideration
might be evidence of oppression. Because of the relation-
ship between the parties and the opportunity for unfair
dealing arising therefrom, the court will closely scru-
tinize the transaction.
24 See note, 3 L. Ed. 322.
25 1 Clarke (N. Y.) 166 (1840).
26 12 Mass. 456 (1815).
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Principles almost as stern are applied as those which govern where
a sale by a cestui que trust to his trustee is drawn in question. To
give validity to such a sale by a mortgagor it must be shown that
the conduct of the mortgagee was, in all things, fair and frank,
and that he paid for the property what it was worth. He must
hold out no delusive hopes; he must exercise no undue influence;
he must take no advantage of the fears or poverty of the other
party. Any indirection or obliquity of conduct is fatal to his
title .... Where confidential relations and the means of oppres-
sion exist, the scrutiny is severer than in the cases of a different
character .... If there is vice in the transaction, the law, while it
will secure to the mortgagee his debt, with interest, will compel
him to give back that which he has taken with unclean hands. 27
Such language standing alone might well affect one's
willingness to accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure, but
an examination of the facts of cases using such language
will restore confidence. In the case from which the
language was quoted, the mortgagee had been getting
interest at the rate of 2 per cent per month compounded,
on unpaid sums. This fact ran a comparatively small
principal debt to ten thousand dollars. Because of
drought the productivity of the land had been impaired,
and there was little chance of selling the land for its
probable worth. There was evidence that the grantors
were given to believe that their deed was security only
and that the grantee had misrepresented the contents of
the deeds to the mortgagors, who could not read English.
It also appeared, by inference at least, that the land was
worth perhaps two and one-half times the amount of
the debt.
Evidence of sharp dealing was likewise shown in the
Illinois case of Cassem v. Heustis, 18 where the additional
factor of a relation of attorney and client entered. The
California case of Bradbury v. Davenport29 came up on
demurrer to a complaint to have a deed declared a mort-
gage, and so the statement that the land was worth a
great deal more than the amount of the debt (about twice
27 Alexander v. Rodriguez, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 323, 20 L. Ed. 406 (1870).
28 201 Ill. 208, 66 N. E. 283 (1903).
29 114 Cal. 593, 46 P. 1062, 55 Am. St. Rep. 92 (1896).
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as much) was admitted, and since the cancellation of the
debt was the only consideration, the demurrer was over-
ruled. But it is to be noted that the complaint also
averred that the deed was procured from the grantor at
a time when the grantor was afflicted with an illness of
which he died a few months later, and because of the
peculiar circumstances appearing in the case the court
reversed the decree of the lower court and gave the
plaintiff (successor in title to the mortgagor) leave to
amend his complaint.
However, in contrast with the last mentioned case is
Deming v. Smith.30 The principal debt fell due in Febru-
ary of 1933. On May 15, 1933, the debt, including unpaid
interest and taxes, came to $135,747.54. About that time
the parties reached an agreement for extension and the
mortgagors placed in escrow a deed conveying their
interest in the land to the mortgagee. If the debt was
paid on or before January 1, 1935, the deed was to be
redelivered to the grantors. If it was not so paid, the
deed was to be delivered to the grantee. On December 31,
1934, the debt not having been paid, the mortgagors com-
menced action against the mortgagee and escrow holder
to enjoin the delivery of the deed by the latter to tne
former. The defendants answered and the mortgagee
filed a cross complaint to quiet title. From judgments for
the mortgagee on complaint and cross-complaint the
plaintiffs appealed. It had been urged by the plaintiffs
that the deed was executed in great haste under fear of
foreclosure and also that the value of the property ex-
ceeded the amount of the debt by $281,850. The court, in
sustaining the judgment for the mortgagee, said:
These rules, which enjoin upon the mortgagee the strictest duties
of fair dealing in such transactions cannot be applied to the facts
alleged in the complaint before us. Giving full effect to the alle-
gation of the great value of the property, we are unable to
discern any inequity in the transaction. Plaintiffs were fully
competent. Without any payment on account of the principal
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of the debt they were allowed more than one year and seven
months within which to dispose of their property at its reason-
able value. It was not alleged that they were unable to do so, nor
does it appear that they were hindered in any way in such efforts
as they may have made to dispose of it. The agreement was not
unfair in this respect. It did not have the effect of depriving
plaintiffs of their property at an unreasonable or unfair price.
The extension of time was for their benefit and it would appear
that they were better off with it than without it. . . . Her [the
mortgagee's] insistence that plaintiffs either execute the deed or
refuse to execute it, for the consideration of an extension of time
[and the cancellation of the debt], was but the assertion of her
legal rights in the premises.
As a matter of law mere inadequacy of consideration
alone is not a ground for voiding a contract or deed. As
a matter of equity it would probably be more accurate to
say that gross inadequacy of consideration is merely a
circumstance from which the court may infer either that
there has been constructive fraud or that the great dif-
ference in value discloses an intent of the parties to re-
gard the deed merely as a continuation of the mortgage
if other circumstances point to such an intent. 1
Where the grantor is personally liable for the mort-
gage debt, as where he signed the notes or where he
assumed the payment of the mortgage upon purchasing
the land from the mortgagor, the extinguishment of the
debt, relieving him from liability on a deficiency decree,
should be sufficient consideration for a deed if the fair
value of the property is less or not greatly in excess of
the indebtedness, including principal, interest, unpaid
taxes, and other advancements. Where the deed is to be
given by one who is not personally liable for the mortgage
debt, as where the grantor purchased the land subject to
the mortgage but did not assume the debt, so that no
deficiency decree could be obtained against him, the dis-
charge of the debt is of no benefit to him and might not
be deemed an adequate consideration. In such situation,
31 See Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139, 19 Curtis 66, 13 L. Ed. 927
(1851); Peugh v. Davis, 6 Otto (96 U. S.) 332, 24 L. Ed. 775 (1878).
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therefore, it would be safer for the mortgagee to pay
the grantor a monetary consideration for the deed, the
amount to be determined by the fair value of the property
if that be more than the mortgage debt, or if it be less,
then an amount which could be considered as more than
nominal consideration.
It may be seen from all of the foregoing cases that
there is a very broad twilight zone between the mortgage
by warranty or quit claim deed and the conditional sale
deed or sale with option to repurchase. Nevertheless, it
is thought to be reasonably safe to continue the practice
which has grown up at the local bar to deal with the
mortgagor in such a manner that the debt is cancelled
and, perhaps, an option of reconveyance is given as part
consideration, and even in some cases a prepaid lease
for the option period. Unless the difference in value is
extreme, so that the court may feel, to quote the language
of some of the decisions, that the creditor is dealing
unconscionably with the borrower, such a case will hardly
be disturbed by any court.
